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cultures of the world and 288 pages on "linguametrics" (2: v). 
Undoubtedly, these volumes will be the standard reference work in this area 
for years to come. All seminary libraries should view this set as a "must buy." 
Anyone who wants to study, work in, or visit any country or church in the world 
should come here for initial orientation and basic information. 
A hard-core statistician would probably hope for more explanation regarding 
the dating of the latest numerical data and criteria for projections into the future. 
Most bibliographic sections for countries seem to have the cut-off date of 1996 (see, 
e.g., Japan) or 1997 (see, e.g., Kenya) or even earlier. When were the last 
bibliographic entries made, or does this vary by section or country? 
Such questions detract little from this monumental work, which is a major 
contribution to the world church. Hearty congratulations and thanks to the 
editors, publisher, and the un~un~contributors, who made it possible. One cannot 
help being amazed at the immense size, spread, and diversity of world 
Christianity. 
Walla Walla College JON L. DYBDAHL 
College Place, Washington 
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This book represents a revision of a doctoral dissertation supervised by Robert 
Jewett and submitted at Northwestern University in 1994. The author is currently 
Associate Professor of Religion at Oakwood College in Huntsville, Alabama. 
The passage treated in this study @om 7:l-6) is, by common consent, one of 
the more difficult in the Pauline corpus. After noting that the law "rules" a person 
as long as that person lives, Paul cites, by way of illustration, the case of a married 
woman who is bound to her husband by the law forbidding adultery. But though 
she is bound by the law as long as she is alive, in the illustration she is said to be so 
bound throughout the lifetime of her husband: should her husband die, she is free 
from the law and may marry another. Paul then tells his readers that they, by 
sharing in Christ's death, have died to the law and are now free to belong to 
another, namely, to Christ, who has been raised from the dead. Here it is not, as 
in the illustration, the living spouse of a deceased partner who is free to enter a 
new relationship; rather, in keeping with the initially stated pridciple, freedom 
from the law is enjoyed by the one who has died. 
Though the analogy is not very felicitous (but what analogy from everyday 
life could Paul have invoked that would illustrate how death sets one free to pursue 
a different way of life?), the main point is clear-believers, by sharing in Christ's 
death, are freed from the law to serve God in the new life of the Spirit. Burton, 
however, is not prepared to concede either the standard interpretation or the 
implication that the passage betrays "Paul's argumentative inadequacyn (xiii). 
Burton believes that when due attention is paid to "the correct understanding of 
the analogical form" and to the precise definition of (Greek) nornos, Rom 7:I-6 
proves "a fine specimen of [Paul's] rhetorical acumen" (17,99). 
The book begins with a rapid summary of previous interpretations of the 
passage, a rhetorical analysis of Romans as a whole, and a look at other analogical 
arguments in the letter. None of these surveys is pursued with sufficient rigor or 
detail to stand on its own; each sets the stage for the author's argument on Rom 
7:l-6. Chapter 4 notes that nomos in Romans "means" a code governing 
community action. The author then proposes that since nomos is used in several 
passages in Romans (2:21-22; 7:7-12; 13:8-10) where commands from the Decalogue 
are quoted, and because the same referent is to be expected in other usages of the 
term in the immediate context, the primary referent of nomos throughout Romans 
is the Decalogue. Chapter 5 suggests that, since the specific law under discussion 
in 7:l-6 is the prohibition of adultery, "law" refers to the Decalogue in each of the 
eight occurrences of the term in this passage as well. 
Chapter 6 contains the author's proposed reading of Rom 7: 1-6. In addition 
to the identification of "the law" with the Decalogue, three features stand out. 
First, the author insists that the point of v. 1 is not that death frees a person 
from the law, but that every living person is under the law's domain. In the 
illustration, the widow who marries a second husband is as bound by the law 
forbidding adultery as she was during her first marriage. In the case of believers, 
their death with Christ changes the nature of their relationship to the law ("one 
is transferred from the old life of sin where nomos condemns, to the new life in the 
Spirit where nomos commends" [87J), but they remain its subjects. 
Second, the Christian audience, Burton believes, must identify first with the 
husband in the analogy who dies (inasmuch as they share in the death of Christ), 
then with the wife who is freed to belong to another (inasmuch as they now 
belong to the resurrected Christ). In the former case, the believer's "flesh" is in 
view-the flesh that dies with the crucified Christ. In the latter case, the believer's 
physical self (Greek soma) is in view, a neutral "self" that comes to share in the 
being of the resurrected Christ. 
Third, as the widow is temporarily freed from the law when her first husband 
dies, but is again its subject when she remarries, so, Burton proposes, believers are 
temporarily freed from the law when the flesh "dies" with Christ, but are again its 
subjects in their new life in Christ. 
The study ends with a brief conclusion (99-101), followed by nine appendices 
(103-135), including an introduction to classical rhetoric (1 10- 1 16) and a survey of 
what the rhetorical handbooks say about arguments from analogy (117-128). 
The book presupposes an academic readership (one would expect nothing 
different of a doctoral dissertation!), but should be accessible to the nonspecialist. 
In terms of the secondary literature, Burton is both well informed and 
informative. Whether his own reading-which he believes to be marked by its 
simplicity (98; cf. 37)-can restore Paul's reputation for rhetorical acumen is 
perhaps open to doubt, partly because the interpretation does not seem (to this 
reader, at least) more straightforward than alternative proposals, partly because, 
should Burton's reading be correct, Paul's rhetorical skill is paradoxically 
displayed in a passage that two millennia of readers have evidently misunderstood. 
In the end, however, Burton's construal of Paul's thought is more important than 
his proposals about Paul's rhetoric. Two aspects of his reading call for brief 
comment here. 
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First, does Paul refer to the Decalogue when he speaks of the "law" in Romans 
as a whole, and in 7: 1-6 in particular? Burton's argument, it seems to me, does not 
succeed in establishing the point. Though he correctly notes that several quotations 
from the "law" are taken from the Decalogue, the same quotations are also 
(necessarily) found in the Mosaic "Torah" that contains the Decalogue. On what 
basis, then, are we to conclude that Paul intends the more narrow rather than the 
broader referent? None is suggested. In fact, it is clear from Galatians that when Paul 
says that the "law" and its "works" do not justify (see, e.g., Gal 2:16; also Rom 3:28, 
28), circumcision and the observance of "days, months, seasons, and years" (Gd 4: 10) 
were included in "the law's" demands. Indeed, the issue of whether Gentiles should 
be subjected to the distinctively Jewish observance of the "Torah" was what 
provoked Paul's discussions about the "law," its purpose, and its relation to the 
believer in Galatians; presumably the same issue lies behind the discussion in Romans 
as well. There appears, then, to be no reason to limit the "law" to the Decalogue. 
Second, does Paul mean that believers were temporady freed from the law, then 
became its subjects again (albeit in a new kind of relationship) through their union 
with the resurrected Christ? This may seem a logical reading of the analogy in Rom 
7:2-3. Should the widow remarry, she would in effect become subject again to the law 
forbidding adultery. But such a conclusion, however logical, presses the analogy 
beyond Paul's point. The apostle ends the analogy with the widow's freedom to 
remarry, saying nothing of any subsequent relationship to the law should she do so. 
In the same passage, Paul says of Christians that they have "died to the law" in order 
that they might belong to "another" (7:4). Here Christ appears to be an alternative 
not simply to life in the "fleshn (the "flesh" is not even mentioned before 73 ,  but to 
the law itseZJ To use Paul's analogy, a fresh relation with the law would entail 
marriage to two husbands! In Rom 7:6, Paul repeats that '~hristians have been 
released from the law-with no hint that the discharge was enjoyed only during a 
brief period of transition. How Paul's various statements of Christian freedom from 
the law are to be combined with his claims of their continuing moral obligations 
remains a perennial problem for his interpreters. But nowhere does he suggest a 
resolution by which the purported freedom is momentary, nor the continuing 
obligation the result of a reconstituted subjection to the law. 
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Carroll, James. Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2001. xii + 756 pp. Hardcover, $28.00. 
Constantine's Sword is a history of the Christian cross interlaced with personal 
vignettes from James Carroll's own life, a mixture of confession, personal 
anguish over the contempt for Jews, which he witnessed since early childhood, and 
a history of the church's sins. A former Catholic priest and the son of an American 
general of Irish descent and a devout Catholic mother, Carroll is deeply tormented 
by the cross planted at Auschwitz. It was the cross, he says, which caused him to 
become a priest, but it was the cross at Auschwitz that caused him to leave the 
priesthood. Though he claims to be Catholic and a Christian, many will question 
